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ABSTRACT 
Human capital theory has traditionally been used as the primary explanation for objective 
career success. However, inconsistent results of the human capital-performance evaluation-
objective career success relationships, as proposed in human capital theory, motivated this 
dissertation to further develop the theory by including economic, managerial, and institutional 
facets. These facets include not only an economic rational perspective, but also a managerial 
component that considers organizational policies and practices, as well as an institutional 
component that considers how environmental pressures influence objective career success. Also, 
boundary conditions for the proposed model are hypothesized explaining how the relationships 
between the constructs differ for managers and non-managers. The hypothesized relationships 
are tested in a Latin American context using rich proprietary data.  
The results of the study lend support for the managerial and institutional facets of the 
theory of human capital of career success. On the other hand, the economic facet was not 
supported due to the non-significant relationships between the human capital components and 
performance evaluation scores. Also, support was found for the boundary condition, rank, on 
performance evaluations. This finding suggests that performance evaluations are a more 
important consideration for the objective career success of non-managers than for managers in 
environments with strong socio-cultural and institutional pressures such as those found in Latin 
America. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 This dissertation examines the factors that may influence individual career success in the 
context of socio-cultural and institutional pressures. Particular theoretical and empirical 
emphases are placed on the potential influences of individual human capital components (i.e., 
education, experience, and training), and on performance evaluations. The theoretical frame used 
for the examination is human capital theory in the form that includes its economic, managerial, 
and institutional facets. Based on this theoretical frame, a formal model is proposed depicting 
performance evaluation as a partial mediator of the relationships between human capital 
components and objective career success operationalized as pay. This model is empirically tested 
in the context of a major Ecuadorian financial services company using a cross-sectional design 
with subsequent path analyses.  
This dissertation is organized in five chapters. Chapter One focuses on the formulation of 
propositions grounded in the economic, managerial, and institutional facets of the human capital 
theory of career success. Based on these propositions, a formal model is developed and specific 
contributions of this theory-based model are outlined. In Chapter Two, the descriptions of 
specific constructs which are components of the proposed theoretical model, are provided along 
with the development of hypothesized relationships among these variables. In Chapter Three, the 
theoretical model is tested using a cross sectional design and structural equation modeling, and 
the results obtained from the analysis are presented. Chapter Four offers an interpretation of the 
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empirical results, and Chapter Five offers theoretical and practical implications of the findings as 
well as directions for future research.  
This research contributes to the career success literature in several ways. The first 
contribution is the extension of the theory of human capital of career success to include not only 
the rational, economic facet but also a managerial facet in terms of managerial influence on 
organizational policies and practices, and an institutional facet that considers managerial 
responses to contextual pressures. This extension of theory addresses how these three facets 
provide complementary explanations for the relationships between human capital constructs and 
career success outcomes. This contribution is significant because existing explanations of how 
career success is influenced by human capital do not combine economic, managerial, and 
institutional facets of human capital theory. 
The second contribution of this study is a rare use of secondary data from a Latin 
American country. This contribution is unique because career success research in a Latin 
American context is virtually non-existent. The socio-cultural and institutional contexts of Latin 
American countries differ from the contexts of other countries in that Latin American countries 
share a “common Roman law heritage, a common Iberian colonial past, and present day patterns 
of social organization” (Rosenn, 1988, p. 128). Furthermore, individuals living in Latin 
American countries share a strong sense of dignity, in-group collectivism, and paternalistic 
behaviors (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004). These unique contextual factors 
may affect performance evaluations and career success in organizations located in Latin 
American countries. 
The third contribution of this dissertation is the appropriateness of the data used for 
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theory testing in this dissertation. The detailed proprietary data on training and performance 
evaluation, which was obtained from a large financial services firm, makes this research different 
from previous studies of this type that mostly relied on large national survey databases of self-
reported data collected in other continents (Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, & Franco-Santos, 2010). 
Self-report measures, used in these studies, have the drawback of relying on individuals‟ 
accuracy of remembering their training and performance (Barron, Berger, & Black, 1994). Also, 
a major assumption of these studies is that individuals were willing to provide accurate 
information (Bing, Stewart, Davison, Green, McIntyre, & James, 2007). Even when studies 
incorporate secondary data that are structured into databases, there is a major concern that 
samples taken from these databases might suffer from inconsistency of measures used across 
organizations. This inconsistency is in particular likely to apply to measures of performance 
evaluations and training collected across firms that use different procedures for performance 
evaluations. In contrast, objective (i.e., non-self-report) data collected from a single firm, as is 
the case in this dissertation, offers two specific benefits for career success research which are: 1) 
a reduction in ambiguity regarding the accuracy of the reported information, and 2) consistency 
in the procedures/ metrics used within a single organization as records of objective career 
success are typically kept in human resource departments and are commonly standardized across 
units within the organization (Heslin, 2005). These benefits are important because very few 
studies have analyzed the associations of human capital constructs in relation to pay outcome 
using a proprietary data set from a firm (Bartel, 1995; Krueger & Rouse, 1998). Furthermore, 
none of these studies was conducted in the context of a developing or emerging country, as is the 
case of this dissertation. 
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The fourth contribution is the examination of the boundary condition for the proposed 
extended human capital theory of career success. In particular, the theoretically relevant variable, 
rank (i.e., managers and non-managers), is examined in terms of its potential to engender a 
boundary condition for the proposed extension of the theory of human capital of career success. 
This contribution is important as it specifies the conditions under which the theory applies and 
therefore adding to the predictive accuracy of the theory (Gray & Cooper, 2010).  
Overall, the research presented in this dissertation fills the need for more comprehensive 
theorizing and empirical testing of the relationships among human capital, performance 
evaluation, and career success. Specifically, the aim is to theoretically explain and empirically 
test the mechanisms by which human capital contributes to objective career success in terms of 
pay is accomplished in this dissertation by (a) the extension of the human capital theory of career 
success across its key facets, and through (b) its testing in a specific South American institutional 
context (i.e., Ecuador) using unique data (i.e., proprietary non-self-report data).  
Theoretical Development and Formulation of Research Propositions 
The twenty-first century has brought about significant environmental changes driven by 
radical technological innovation, globalization, and hypercompetition (Cascio & Aguinis, 2008). 
These changes have forced organizations to shift away from bureaucratic and vertical, 
hierarchical organizational structures to more organic and horizontal, flatter structures (Gomez-
Mejia, Berrone, & Franco-Santos, 2010). This structural flattening has required employees to 
accumulate human capital in order for them to be highly employable (Pulakos, Arad, Donovan, 
& Plamondon, 2000) in organizations that strive to stay nimble and competitive (Cascio & 
Aguinis, 2008). The flattening has therefore transformed the way scholars and practitioners 
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understand the traditional concept of career success (Heslin, 2005), as the processes of 
organizational delayering, downsizing, and outsourcing have limited the desirable options of 
achieving career success through hierarchical progression of promotion (Evans, Gunz, & Jalland, 
1997; Hall, 2002; Reitman & Schneer, 2003). Therefore, as the organizational structure and 
processes have been changing, so has the role of human capital become salient in achieving 
career success. To capture and study that salience, the influence of human capital on career 
success is examined in this dissertation using the lens of three facets of human capital theory: 
economic, managerial, and institutional. 
 
Human Capital Theory of Career Success: Economic Facet 
Career success has been defined as work related outcomes gained over a lifetime of work 
experiences (London & Stumpf, 1982; Judge & Bretz, 1994; Seibert, Crant, & Kraimer, 1999; 
Sullivan & Baruch, 2009). Achieving career success is important from both individual and 
organizational standpoints (Feldman, 1989; 2002). From an individual standpoint, achieving 
career success may lead to the improvement in social status, job satisfaction, health, and an 
overall positive emotional state (Becker, 1993; Judge, Cable, Boudreau, & Bretz, 1995). From an 
organizational standpoint, career success is associated with organizationally significant outcomes 
such as higher productivity, citizenship behaviors, lower turnover, and ultimately a higher return 
on investment per employee (Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, & Franco-Santos, 2010). 
Career success is objective when it reflects observable achievements of an individual, 
such as pay and/or promotion (Arthur, Khapova & Wilderom, 2005; Judge & Bretz, 1994; Judge, 
Cable, Boudreau, & Bretz, 1995). Objective career success is different from subjective career 
 6  
 
success, which reflects self-perceived individual accomplishments during one‟s career (Hall & 
Mirvis, 1996; Heslin, 2005; Ng, Eby, Sorensen, & Feldman, 2005; Abele & Wiese, 2008). This 
distinction is important because empirical evidence suggest that factors influencing subjective 
career success are commonly different from those that lead to objective career success (Arnold & 
Cohen, 2008). Specifically, human capital and socio-demographic antecedents have a stronger 
relationship with objective career success while organizational sponsorship (i.e., supervisor 
support, organizational resources) and stable individual traits (i.e., neuroticism, 
conscientiousness) are stronger predictors of subjective career success (Ng, Eby, Sorensen, & 
Feldman, 2005). 
Empirical evidence suggests that human capital is one of the main drivers of objective 
career success (see Ng, Eby, Sorensen, & Feldman, 2005). In particular, labor economists have 
used human capital theory as one of the most powerful explanations as to why pay increases over 
time (Williams, 2009). Human capital theory suggests that a diverse set of economic benefits can 
be accrued from the accumulation of individual knowledge, skills, and abilities (Becker, 1964). 
The roots of human capital theory originate from Adam Smith (1776) who suggested that 
investments in acquiring abilities is the primary means of generating revenues (Zula & 
Chermack, 2007). The concept of the investment in human capital was later theoretically 
developed and empirically tested in the studies conducted by leading economic scholars (Zula & 
Chermack, 2007). These scholars argued that the production model should include human capital 
in addition to physical capital, labor, land, and entrepreneurship (Nafukho, Hairston, & Brooks, 
2004). Primarily, the development of human capital theory has been pursued by Becker, who is 
considered to be the founding father of the „economics of education‟ as a distinct research field 
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(Zula & Chermack, 2007). 
The fundamental assumption of human capital theory is that individuals rationally weigh 
the benefits and costs of investing in their education and training in such a way as to maximize 
their objective career success (Becker, 1993). According to this assumption, education and 
training are the most important investments in human capital. People are motivated to invest in 
their education because they expect such investment to result in greater career success, while 
organizations are motivated to invest in employee training with the expectation that this 
investment will increase their productivity and profitability. From the overall economic 
perspective, the value of the investment in human capital is equal to the net present value of the 
future expected cash flows (Becker, 1962). In economic terms, “profit maximizing firms 
compete for utility maximizing workers, and the expected lifetime compensation of a worker 
with a given set of observed characteristics is equal to the expected lifetime productivity of a 
randomly selected worker with those characteristics” (Weiss, 1995, p. 136). In summary, human 
capital theory explains variation in income generated from diverse forms of human capital 
investments such as education and training (Becker, 1962). 
Development of human capital through training, education, and tacit knowledge (i.e., 
tenure) are likely to lead to beneficial outcomes such as career success (Fang, Zikic, & 
Novicevic, 2009). Development through training can be in the form of general or specific 
training. General training is defined as training that yields generic knowledge, skills, and 
abilities, and can be used and valued by other organizations beyond the one providing the 
training (Becker, 1962). In contrast, specific training involves developing knowledge that is 
uniquely beneficial to the organization that is offering the training. In his later work, Becker 
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(1993) broadened the scope of organizations that may benefit from specific training beyond the 
particular organization offering the training to other firms within the same industry. Therefore, 
specific training may yield a set of skills that could be transferable across jobs within a specific 
industry. In this case, workers are compensated for skills that are not general or firm specific but 
rather industry specific (Neal, 1995; Parent, 2000). The distinction between general and specific 
training has potential implications for employee mobility. Specifically, employees with greater 
general training will become more marketable in the labor market and therefore may not develop 
a sense of loyalty or attachment to the firm offering the training. In contrast, when firm specific 
training is offered to an employee, that individual will be less likely to turnover as his or her 
skills are less marketable to other firms while his or her value to the current employer will be 
enhanced (Becker, 1993).  
In addition to developing their human capital through training, individuals may develop 
their human capital through schooling (i.e., formal education), experience, or tenure (Becker, 
1993). Complementarity of these sources of human capital development is supported by past 
research that suggests that human capital is the result of the development of ability, education, 
and skills (Blundell, Dearden, Meghir, & Sianesi, 1999).  
Human capital theory suggests that formal education, specific training, and experience 
accumulated by working in the firm over time (i.e., tenure) enhance not only individual 
performance but also individual career success in the form of increased compensation. Therefore, 
investments in human capital offer benefits to the individual in terms of objective career success 
(Becker, 1964). 
Proposition 1: Investments in different components of human capital are related to 
objective career success. 
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Human Capital Theory of Career Success: Managerial Facet 
The assumptions of human capital theory are perfect competition for jobs, no barriers to 
entry into particular occupations, as well as that pay differentials are due to differences in 
productivity (Blundell, Dearden, Meghir, & Sianesi, 1999). These assumptions reflect the 
economic rationality that underlies the economic facet of human capital theory, which proposes 
that investing in human capital is likely to translate into greater objective career success through 
properly evaluated job performance. However, this perspective alone is idealistic, as it fails to 
consider that: 1) employees may not be motivated to use all of their human capital for 
organizational purposes, and 2) organizations have the discretion to create policies and practices 
that may favorably or unfavorably influence how individuals use their human capital. Therefore, 
the managerial facet of human capital reflects the way organizational policies and practices may 
add what economists would call a “behavioral” spin to the traditional rational economic model of 
human capital.  
Performance evaluation is one of the most important human resource tools, which is used 
as a means by which organizations leverage their human capital (Chiang & Birtch, 2010). 
Effective evaluations have been shown to lead to numerous positive outcomes such as greater 
employee productivity and quality, job satisfaction, commitment, and trust (Ghorpade, Chen, & 
Caggiano, 1995; Gutherire, 2001; Kuvaas, 2008; Mayer & Davis, 1999; Pettijohn, Pettijohn, & 
Amico, 2001). However, only in ideal cases, performance evaluations offer an “objective, 
rational, and systematic way for organizations to manage workforce performance” (Chiang & 
Birtch, 2010, p. 3). 
The managerial facet of human capital theory complements the economic facet by 
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suggesting that highly skilled or trained employees may exhibit behavior of withdrawing their 
maximum rational effort when their performance is not appropriately evaluated and rewarded. In 
other words, although they possess individual knowledge, skills, and abilities developed through 
education, training, and tenure, these employees may perform below their potential because they 
use their time and talent at their own discretion (Bailey, 1993). Therefore, the managerial facet of 
human capital theory states that the human resource practice of performance evaluation needs to 
be designed appropriately to affect employee motivation positively by encouraging employees to 
work both harder and smarter for the benefit of the organization and to achieve objective career 
success. Based on this managerial facet, one‟s on-the-job performance is hypothesized to be a 
function of his or her ability, knowledge, and skills, as well as of effective performance-appraisal 
policies and practices that induce motivation for superior performance (Huselid, 1995).  
Pay, which is a proxy for objective career success, is a desired correlate of performance 
evaluations that has received great attention of human resource (HR) professionals. The HR 
policy of linking pay to performance evaluations has been referred to as pay-for-performance 
(PFP). While the debate whether pay is a sufficient motivator to influence adequate performance 
is not over, several meta-analyses have supported the pay-for-performance model (e.g. Jenkins, 
Mitra, Gupta, & Shaw, 1998; Locke, Feren, McCaleb, & Denny, 1980). Furthermore, most firms 
seem to be using some form of PFP (Rynes, Gerhart, & Parks, 2005), and the tendency for firms 
to use PFP has been growing (Heneman, Ledford, & Gresham, 2000).  
The pay-for-performance literature suggests that the influence of this type of HR policy 
on both motivation and performance is through incentive effects and sorting effects. Research 
suggests that rewards that are proximal to the behaviors are rewarding and tend to be effective 
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motivators. Pay is considered to be a proximal reward and therefore an efficient form of 
incentive. In contrast, sorting effects suggest that individuals are either attracted to or repelled 
from different pay systems. Therefore, a pay-for-performance reward structure may attract 
individuals with a particular profile, while repelling others (McNatt, Glassman, & McAfee, 
2007). Based on the managerial facet of human capital theory, the extent to which the pay-for-
performance pay structure will leverage human capital and motivate individuals to make use of 
their knowledge, skills, and abilities acquired through education and training will depend on the 
effectiveness of performance evaluation/appraisal policies and practices adopted by managers.  
Proposition 2: When a pay-for-performance system is implemented, performance 
evaluation scores explain the relationship between human capital components and 
objective career success. 
 
Human Capital Theory of Career Success: Institutional Facet 
The institutional facet of human capital theory complements the economic and 
managerial facets by addressing political, socio-cultural, and institutional pressures that 
managers face. In other words, while the economic and managerial facets of human capital 
theory provide an explanation for the mechanisms by which investments in human capital, along 
with the appropriately designed performance evaluation policies and practices, increases 
performance and eventually objective career success, these facets do not consider the political, 
socio-cultural, and institutional context in which the policies and practices affecting performance 
evaluations and objective career success are embedded. Specifically, the implementation of HR 
policies and practices of performance evaluation and compensation that managers‟ design and 
use is often constrained by formal and informal institutional pressures.  
The institutional facet of human capital theory posits that performance evaluation and pay 
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practices are constrained by the environments in which they are embedded and therefore this 
socially thick view of career success may be as explanatory as economic or managerial views. 
This institutional facet proposes that a firm‟s performance evaluation and pay practices become 
more similar (i.e., isomorphic) with the practices of other companies operating in the firm‟s field, 
as the firm seeks in this way legitimacy of its stakeholders in order to improve its possibilities of 
survival under competitive and institutional pressures (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The specific 
institutional pressures that influence a firm‟s HR practices to become isomorphic with other 
firms‟ HR practices are: coercive isomorphism, mimetic processes, and normative pressures 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Coercive isomorphism results from formal and informal pressures 
driven by resource dependency, cultural expectations, and regulations affecting the HR function. 
Mimetic processes result from benefits of imitation or modeling of HR practices in terms of 
reduced uncertainty. Finally, normative pressures stem from professionalization of HR personnel 
and the formation of their professional networks that favor benchmarking.  
Managers, facing coercive, mimetic, and normative institutional pressures, may differ in 
their choices of strategic responses to these pressures (Oliver, 1991). In particular, managers‟ 
choices may vary from passive to proactive responses towards these pressures. Therefore, 
whether HR managers respond passively or proactively to institutional pressures is likely to 
impact the strength of the relationships among human capital, performance evaluations, and 
career success. 
Most common responses to institutional pressures are based on the labor market data 
collected by consulting firms because their data reveal practices that are referent for the firm‟s 
legitimacy (Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, & Franco-Santos, 2010; York & Brown, 2008). The typical 
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practices serve as a referent point to select strategic responses in terms of pay policies which may 
be to lead, lag, or meet pay relative to the referent companies. A general assumption is that the 
leading firms prefer to pay higher salaries in order to recruit higher quality personnel, and lower 
their turnover (Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, & Franco-Santos, 2010).  
Human resource practices of pay that are based on rewarding for social standing and 
reputation have been referred to as symbolic HR practices. These practices are often the result of 
conventions imposed by the sector in which the company operates (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
Zucker, 1987; Fernandez-Alees, Cuevas-Rodriguez, & Valle-Cabrera, 2006). Managerial choice 
of specific HR practices is symbolic and conventional because it is often influenced by cultural 
values. While national culture significantly affects how people perceive their work and behave in 
their work environment, this line of research has been largely overlooked in the career literature 
(Heslin, 2005). Ferris and colleagues (2008, p. 147) suggest that performance evaluation system 
“like other mechanisms of accountability, is subject to lapses and ineffectiveness, particularly 
when all the various influences that operate on such mechanisms are not fully considered and 
investigated… performance evaluation systems, as accountability mechanisms, are embedded 
within complex social, emotional, cognitive, political, and relationship contexts, which need to 
be understood in order to adequately interpret the results or outcomes derived from such 
systems.” Due to this cultural embeddedness of performance evaluations and career success in 
terms of pay (Inkson, Khapova, and Parker, 2007), cultural influence has recently attracted 
growing interest from researchers (Kats, Van Emmerik, Blenkinsopp, & Khapova, 2010).  
We know little about this cultural influence in developing countries because most 
published research on career success has been based on studies conducted in the United States or 
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other Western developed countries (Counsell, 2002; Pringle & Mallon, 2003). Therefore, it is 
highly important to understand how larger societal processes and cultural influences (Khapova, 
Arthur, & Wilderom, 2007) shape HR policies and perceptions of career success in developing 
countries (e.g. Baruck, 2004; Thomas & Inkson, 2006). More specifically, it is important to 
identify how cultural influence is mapped on performance evaluations and objective career 
success in the context of developing countries (Khapova, Vinkenburg, & Arnold, 2009).  
 Due to cultural influence, managerial strategic responses in terms of adopted HR policies 
and practices may be specific in developing countries (Lawler et al., 2010). Designing HR 
policies and practices to match the particular cultures in which organizations are embedded, may 
be a critical factor influencing career success (Newman & Nollen, 1996). “The unique norms, 
values, and beliefs inherent in different cultures affect the way employees are motivated and 
controlled as well as their equity, expectancy, and justice perceptions. Specifically, an appraisal 
architecture developed and regarded as effective in one country may not be suitable on another 
cultural setting” (Chiang & Birtch, 2010, p. 4). Therefore, performance evaluation is likely to be 
affected by cultural influences because the performance appraisal process is greatly influenced 
by norms, values, and beliefs espoused by a particular society (Chiang & Birtch, 2010). For 
example, culture may influence the extent to which organizational politics are acceptable and/ or 
tolerated. 
Institutional pressures may influence objective career success through the policies and 
practices adopted by HR managers (Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, & Franco-Santos, 2010). For 
example, HR managers are likely to formulate pay strategies that are isomorphic to those used by 
their competitors. Furthermore, Coombs and Rosse (1992) suggest that “compensation practices 
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are often based on customs, imitation of other firms, administrative convenience, and ad hoc 
programs developed through narrow functional lenses” (Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, & Franco-
Santos, 2010, p. 55).   
Proposition 3: Institutional pressures influence managerial responses leading to a direct 
relationship between the human capital components and objective career success. 
 
The above three research propositions are integrated to propose a formal model shown in 
Figure 1. This model depicts the relationships suggested by the three facets of human capital 
theory of career success. In the following Chapter Two, each component of the model shown in 
Figure 1 is described and the relationships between the components are hypothesized. 
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CHAPTER 2  
FORMAL MODEL AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 To model the three facets of the human capital theory of career success, the human 
capital components are described in this Chapter Two, as well as their relationships with 
performance evaluations and objective career success. These constructs and their hypothesized 
relationships are depicted in the model shown in Figure 1. 
Human Capital Components 
 Human capital reflects knowledge, skills, and abilities acquired through education, 
experience, and training which are commonly called human capital components (Becker, 1962). 
These components of human capital are described in the forthcoming section of this Chapter 
Two and their hypothesized relationships with performance evaluation and career success are 
formally articulated.  
Education. Most research in the field of careers has used the economic facet of human 
capital theory to examine the influence of education on career success (Judge, Cable, Boudreau, 
& Bretz, 1995). Past studies indicate that education is positively associated with several 
outcomes such as more promotions, higher pay, lower turnover, less absenteeism, and less 
substance abuse (Weiss, 1995; Judge, Cable, Boudreau, & Bretz, 1995). Focusing on pay that is 
a proxy for objective career success, Becker (1993) suggests that pay of more educated and 
trained employees is almost always higher than the pay of less educated and trained ones. Also, 
Singh, Ragins, and Tharenou (2009) found education to be a significant predictor of pay even 
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after controlling for age, gender, organizational size, rank, industry type, and promotion history. 
Even in the context of China, a country with different socio-cultural and institutional forces than 
countries researched in the West, a significant positive relationship between education and pay 
was found (Fleisher, Hu, Li, & Kim, 2010). Therefore, it is not surprising that in a meta-analysis 
of career success, education was found to be the strongest predictor of pay (Ng, Eby, Sorensen, 
& Feldman, 2005). In other words, the findings of empirical research support the claim that the 
relationship between education and objective career success is significant (e.g. Nabi, 1999; 
Howard, 1986; Melamed, 1996; Mincer, 1974). 
The economic facet of human capital theory assumes that investing in education leads to 
greater productivity, which is captured by performance evaluations (Daly, Hitchens, & Wagner, 
1985; Mason & van Ark, 1994; Steedman & Wagner, 1987, 1989; Prais, Jarvis, & Wagner, 
1989). This suggests that organizations will only invest in developing the educational component 
of human capital to the extent that they can receive a satisfactory return on their investment in 
the form of increased productivity. More recently, in a meta-analysis by Ng and Feldman (2009), 
the authors found education to be a significant predictor of core task performance. In summary, 
based on human capital theory and previous empirical research, performance evaluation scores 
are likely to explain how education is mapped onto objective career success. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis is provided: 
Hypothesis 1: Performance evaluation scores will mediate the relationship between education 
and objective career success in terms of pay. 
 
Tenure as Firm-Specific Experience. The economic facet of the human capital theory suggests 
that time spent in the firm will yield firm-specific knowledge that is expected to result in greater 
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productivity and subsequently greater objective career success. Tenure is defined as the length of 
employment with the organization of current employment (Hitt, Bierman, Shimizu, & Kochhar, 
2001). The unique characteristic of the tenure component of human capital is that it is often path-
dependent (Barney, 1991; Itami, 1987) in terms of tacit knowledge that can only be developed 
along the trajectories of interactions in the specific work environment (Lepak & Snell, 2002; 
Polanyi, 1967; Williamson, 1975).  
The length of tenure signals to what extent both the organization and its employees are 
motivated to remain in a lasting relationship. While the organization seeks a higher return on its 
investment, employees accept that their mobility is restricted with tenure because it reduces their 
uncertainty of searching for a new job. Extant literature indicates a positive relationship between 
tenure and objective career success in terms of pay (Bronars & Famulari, 1997; Judge & Bretz, 
1994). In particular, Boudreau, Boswell, and Judge (2001) found organizational tenure to 
significantly influence objective career success in terms of pay in both the US and European 
samples. Furthermore, tenure was found to be a significant predictor of pay in the meta-analysis 
performed by Ng and colleagues (2005). Overall, it seems that while HR managers espouse that 
the compensation system in their organizations is primarily based on performance, in practice 
most firms primarily base rewards on seniority (Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, & Franco-Santos, 2010).  
When tenure, along with the achieved seniority status, is mapped onto performance 
evaluations, the length of an employees stay in a particular firm, along with the length of time in 
their profession, is positively related to career success (Judge, Cable, Boudreau, & Bretz, 1995). 
Specifically, Topel (1991) found that ten years of seniority resulted in pay raises of 25% while in 
a replication of the same study, Altonji and Williams (2005) found a 10% increase in pay over a 
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ten-year period. Obtaining similar findings, Williams (2009) found pay to increase by 1% per 
year over the first ten years on the job in the UK. Changes in tenure typically lead to changes in 
career success in terms of pay through a gradual process which may be influenced by the design 
of the performance evaluation system. This indicates that performance evaluations may influence 
the way in which tenure has impact on career success.  
While the relationship between tenure and increase in pay has had strong support from 
previous research, the relationship between tenure and productivity has yielded mixed findings. 
The seminal study by Medoff and Abraham (1981) specifically tested the relationship between 
tenure, productivity, and compensation and found that productivity (using performance 
evaluations as a proxy) did not explain pay increases. In a replication of that study, Flabbi and 
Ichino (2001) also found that performance did not mediate the relationship between tenure and 
compensation. On the other hand, both theory as well as an important number of empirical 
studies have supported the tenure-performance relationship (Schmidt, Hunter, & Outerbridge, 
1986; Hall & Hall, 1976; Sturman, 2003; Van Iddekinge, Ferris, Perrewe, Perryman, Blass, & 
Heetderks, 2009). In summary, based on human capital theory and previous empirical research, 
performance evaluation scores are likely to explain how tenure is mapped onto objective career 
success. Therefore, the following is hypothesized: 
Hypothesis 2: The performance evaluation scores will mediate the relationship between the 
tenure component of human capital and objective career success in terms of pay. 
 
Training. Training that is provided to employees can be either general or specific. 
General training is a source of generic knowledge that can be used for the benefit of the 
organization but is also portable to other organizations. In contrast, specific training provides 
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knowledge specific to the firm offering the training and therefore it is virtually not portable. The 
economic facet of human capital theory proposes that specific training will have a significant 
impact on wages while general training will not be of influence (Melero, 2004).  
Becker (1962) suggests taking an economic perspective that firms should pay employees 
who received general training the same amount as they would earn elsewhere while paying those 
with specific training a premium over their average market value. Also, individuals who receive 
specific training are less likely to turnover than those with more general training (Becker, 1962). 
As a result, their increases in pay will be more significant (Blundell, Dearden, Meghir, & 
Sianesi, 1999) because the knowledge acquired through specific training is less portable 
(Blundell, Dearden, & Meghir, 1996; Lillard & Tan, 1992; Booth, 1993).  
In line with the economic facet of human capital theory, specific training has been found 
to consistently have a significant influence on objective career success (Blundell, Dearden, 
Meghir, & Sianesi, 1999). For example, Singh et al. (2009) found a significant relationship 
between training with pay even after controlling for age, gender, organizational size, rank, 
industry type and promotional history. Furthermore, in a meta-analysis, Ng et al. (2005) found 
training and skill development opportunities to influence significantly and positively objective 
career success.  
In line with the managerial facet of human capital theory, organizations are likely to offer 
training expecting to witness the effects of their investment in the form of improved employee 
performance. Training is expected to develop job-specific skills that enhance individual 
performance (Salas, Prince, Bowers, Stout, Oser, & Cannon-Bowers, 1999) and therefore result 
in greater productivity (Hatch & Dyer, 2004). Several empirical studies found a significant 
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relationship between specific training and performance. In a longitudinal study, Van Iddekinge et 
al. (2009) found that the training intercept and slope had significantly positive relationships with 
customer service performance. The positive effects of training on productivity have been found 
to exist both at the individual as well as organizational levels (Bartel, 1994). 
 Training offers employees numerous benefits beyond skill development. For example, 
training may also influence work-place attitudes, self-efficacy, and motivation to apply the newly 
learned knowledge and skills (Kraiger, Ford, & Salas, 1993; Chen & Klimoski, 2007). Specific 
training is expected to allow individuals to acquire firm and industry specific knowledge that 
should enhance performance because of the acquired specific knowledge, skills, and abilities. 
However, specific training will be mapped on one‟s objective career success over a period of 
time to the extent performance is properly evaluated. In conclusion, based on human capital 
theory and previous empirical research, performance evaluation scores are likely to explain how 
specific training is mapped onto objective career success. Therefore, the following hypotheses is 
proposed: 
Hypothesis 3: Performance evaluation scores will mediate the relationship between specific 
training and objective career success in terms of pay. 
 
 
Performance Evaluation. The managerial facet of the human capital theory of career 
success suggests that performance evaluations influence objective career success in terms of pay 
only to the extent to which managers are able to devise appropriate pay-for-performance policies 
and implement them as effective practices. These practices are effective when they motivate 
employees to use their knowledge, skills, and abilities to their fullest extent. Various theories 
provide explanations for the manner in which pay-for-performance policies and practices could 
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align divergent goals of the principal and agent (i.e., agency theory, transaction cost economics), 
reinforce desired behaviors (i.e., operant conditioning theory), motivate particular behaviors (i.e., 
expectancy theory), and attract individuals with desired characteristics (i.e., sorting effects) 
(Chiang & Birtch, 2010). Three of the most frequently used incentive motivators in organizations 
are money, social recognition, and feedback, with money being the most frequently used form of 
motivation (Stajkovic & Luthans, 2001). Empirical evidence, though somewhat equivocal, 
suggests that money is an important motivator for most people (Rynes, Gerhart, Minette, 2004). 
Through both sorting and incentive effects, pay-for-performance compensation systems have 
been suggested to provide two advantages over fixed salary compensation 1) they insure that 
higher quality employees are attracted, and 2) they motivate employees to use their knowledge, 
skills, and abilities (Cadsby, Song, & Tapan, 2007). 
Pay-for-performance has shown to be strongly related to individual performance 
(Jenkins, Mitra, Gupta, & Shaw, 1998). Chiang and Birch (2010) found support for the pay-for- 
performance relationship and furthermore suggest that employees perceive a pay-for- 
performance HR policy as an investment in them that is made by the organization. Scott, Shaw 
and Duffy (2008) found pay-for-performance as particularly effective when a clear link exists 
between pay and performance, emphasizing that this clarity is especially for older employees. 
Also, a study examining the interaction between compensation system (i.e., fixed wage versus 
incentive-based) and task attractiveness indicated that pay-for-performance worked better under 
conditions where the employee did not perceive the task as attractive (Fessler, 2003). 
Furthermore, Lazear (1999, 2000) found that after switching from fixed-wages to a pay-for- 
performance compensation system, the firm experienced a 44 percent increase in output per 
 24  
 
worker, where half of this increase was due to incentive effects and the other half to sorting 
effects. Cadsby, Song, and Tapon (2007) also found that the incentive and sorting effects of pay- 
for- performance HR systems lead to 38% greater performance than fixed salaries.  
In summary, several theoretical explanations, empirical results (i.e., Heneman, 1990) and 
meta-analyses (i.e., Locke et al., 1980; Guzzo et al., 1985; Jenkins et al., 1998) show support for 
the relationship between pay and performance. Based on the broad theoretical grounding and 
strong empirical evidence, the following hypothesis is presented: 
Hypothesis 4: Performance evaluation scores will have a positive significant relationship with 
objective career success in terms of pay. 
 
Overall, the economic and managerial facets of human capital theory indicate that the 
mediating mechanism of the relationship between human capital and objective career success is 
performance evaluation. However, the institutional facet of the theory of human capital indicates 
that institutional pressures and socio-cultural factors may have a direct influence on pay in spite 
of the mediating role of performance evaluation scores between the human capital components 
and objective career success in terms of pay. As a result, because managers may give primacy in 
pay to these factors rather than performance scores, performance evaluation scores may not be 
the only significant factor influencing objective career success as measured by pay because 
managers pressured by the institutional forces of benchmarking may reward reputation of 
educational background and specificity of training independent of performance evaluation. The 
common rationale that was provided for the practice is to secure the retention of well-educated 
and well-trained employees (Humphreys, 2002).  
 Benchmarking practices commonly involve reliance on salary surveys that are often used 
 25  
 
as guidelines to align average pay for specific tiers of employees with the benchmarked group. 
Therefore, the HR manager may respond to institutional pressures proactively by establishing 
pay bands to fit the reference to the benchmarked ones. In effect, this alignment may bypass the 
pay-for-performance system. As a result, changes in career success in terms of pay may be due to 
the direct effects of the symbolic value of human capital that result from the alignment of pay 
and go beyond the mediating effects of evaluated individual performance. Therefore, this 
practice may result in a direct influence of human capital development on objective career 
success in terms of pay in spite of the influence that performance evaluation scores may have on 
pay (Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, & Franco-Santos, 2010).  
 The influence of human capital development on objective career success in terms of pay 
may also be reinforced by the salience of socio-cultural factors. For example, the process of 
performance evaluations may become a highly socialized and internally political process, 
stimulating consensus that is typically expected to be achieved in organizations located in 
developing countries. In cultures of developing countries that are low in assertiveness, high in 
uncertainty avoidance, high in power distance, and high in in-group collectivism, managers may 
not be assertive in implementing a strict pay-for-performance system as they may not want to 
jeopardize group harmony. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 5: Managerial emphasis of symbolic aspects of human capital will lead to a 
positive direct effect of a) education, b) tenure, and c) specific training on objective career 
success in terms of pay. 
 
Moderating Component 
Rank.  A more rigorous test for theory requires that we specify the boundary conditions 
that may delimit the context within which the theory applies (Bacharach, 1989; Whetten, 1989). 
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This implies focus on the most relevant moderators. In the domain of career success the 
theoretically most relevant moderator is rank (managers and non-managers) as managers may be 
perceived as entitled relative to non-managers. The grouping of employees into managers and 
non-managers is relevant because economic and managerial facets of human capital theory do 
not explain how HR policies and practices are structured and implemented across different ranks 
within the organization. The grouping into managers and non-managers is relevant in the domain 
of careers because managerial career success differs from non-managerial career success in three 
ways (Tosi, Werner, Katz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2000): 1) managerial decisions are difficult to 
measure; 2) managers benefit from information asymmetries regarding organizational processes 
and decisions; and 3) managers may use information to their own benefit before attempting to 
generate benefits for the firm (Ammeter, Douglas, Gardner, Hochwarter, & Ferris, 2002; Lepak 
& Snell, 2002).  
Managerial performance is more difficult to measure than non-managerial performance 
because “high levels of interdependence often make it difficult to isolate individual managers‟ 
contributions to outcomes” (Wood, Atkins, & Bright, 1999, p. 703). In other words, traditional 
reward systems may sometimes be inappropriate for managerial positions because of the 
difficulty of measuring the individual manager‟s outcomes (Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, & Franco-
Santos, 2010). Therefore, managers are typically compared to the evaluations of other managers 
to help ensure internal equity and the desired distribution of bonuses within the budget (Wood, 
Atkins, & Bright, 1999).  
The institutional facet of the human capital theory of career success also suggests that 
culture may have a strong influence on differentiating managerial pay from the pay of non-
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managers (Tosi & Greckhamer, 2004). For example, the high level of power distance is expected 
to influence the acceptance of larger pay differential between managerial and non-managerial 
groups. In addition, in cultures where differences in social status and positions of power are more 
socially accepted, it is more acceptable for managers not only to have higher pay levels but also 
to have more discretion to influence their pay (Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, & Franco-Santos, 2010).  
For a typical organization, the pool of potential individuals who could be hired for 
managerial positions is commonly limited (Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, & Franco-Santos, 2010). As 
the market for higher-ranked managers is segmented based on firm size and industry the 
potential applicant pool is even further reduced (Hambrick, Finkelstein, & Mooney, 2005). 
Frequently, the number of the subordinates and the level of resources managers are responsible, 
rather than their evaluated performance, are of influence on their level of pay (Gomez-Mejia, 
Berrone, & Franco-Santos, 2010).  
Overall, consistent with human capital theory, managers tend to have more years of 
education and experience, and make more personal sacrifice and investment in their careers than 
non-managers do. In other words, “few people have the ability, stamina, or willingness to pay the 
associated personal price in terms of stress, family life, loss of privacy, and minimal leisure time. 
So their higher pay may be seen as a return on this human capital investment (Gerhart and 
Malkovich, 1990; Buck et al., 2008)” (Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, & Franco-Santos, 2010, p. 135). 
Furthermore, research has shown greater returns for managerial training than for non-managerial 
training (Lillard and Tan, 1992; Bartel, 1995; Blundell, Dearden, Meghir, & Sianesi, 1999). In 
light of those differences, Baker, Jensen, & Murphy, (1988) found that pay is seldom based on 
performance at the managerial level. Also, Flabbi and Ichino (2001) found that rank mattered 
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because only at the lowest levels of the firm performance explained objective career success. 
This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6: Rank will moderate the relationship between performance evaluation scores and 
pay such that the relationship between performance evaluations scores and pay will be 
stronger for non-managers than for managers. 
 
Influential Variables Beyond Those Hypothesized in the Theoretical Model 
Demographic factors have been found to influence different behavioral patterns and 
outcomes, including promotions and pay attainment (Pfeffer, 1981; Judge, Cable, Boudreau, & 
Bretz, 1995). Research findings suggest that demographic variables are important predictors of 
career success for both managers and non-managers (Gattiker & Larwood, 1988, 1989; Judge, 
Cable, Boudreau, & Bretz, 1995). As the theoretical and empirical focus of this paper is to 
examine how different components of human capital and performance evaluation influence 
objective career success, demographic variables (age, gender, marital status, and number of 
dependents) are used only as control variables. 
Age. Age has been consistently found to be a predictor of objective career success (Cox 
& Nkomo, 1991; Gattiker & Larwood, 1988, 1989; Gutteridge, 1973; Harrell, 1969; Jaskolka, 
Beyer, & Trice, 1985), presumably because extrinsic outcomes accrue over time (Judge et al., 
1995). In particular, Judge and colleagues (1995) found that older individuals had higher pay 
than did younger individuals. More recently, in a meta-analysis, Ng and colleagues (2005) found 
age and career success in terms of pay to have a significant positive relationship. 
Research of aging and performance evaluations has yielded mixed results. One line of 
research has shown that aging negatively influences individual performance because over time 
older individuals lose certain important abilities, such as speed, dexterity, motor coordination 
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and strength (Giniger, Dispenzieri, & Eisenberg, 1983; Rhodes, 1983). Age has also been shown 
to be associated with decreases in performance on tests of learning, memory, reasoning, spatial 
abilities, and psychomotor speed (Lindenberger & Baltes, 1994; Salthouse & Babcock, 1991; 
Verhaeghen & Salthouse, 1997). More recently, research suggests that age is negatively related 
to objective performance measures during training (Hirschfeld & Thomas, in press). However, in 
socially-rich tasks, the findings about the relationship between age and performance have been 
inconsistent (Rhodes, 1983; McEnvoy & Cascio, 1989; Waldman & Avolio, 1986). 
Aging has also been shown to influence motivation and social perceptions, which are the 
factors that influence performance and pay (objective career success). Research findings suggest 
that age is negatively related to general motivation (Judge & Hulin, 1993; Judge & Locke, 1993), 
pay increases (Siegel & Ghiselli, 1971), and training opportunities (Blundell, Dearden, Meghir, 
& Sianesi, 1999). From an economic perspective, organizations offer older employees fewer 
training and networking opportunities as they are expected to remain less time in the workforce 
and therefore offer the firm a lower return on investment (Blundell, 1999; Kuhlen, 1977; 
Lawrence, 1988). In summary, age is expected to influence both pay and performance, and 
therefore needs to be included as a control variable in the proposed model. 
Gender. A considerable amount of research suggests that women do not achieve the 
same level of objective career success as men do (Judge, Cable, Boudreau, & Bretz, 1995). For 
example, Judge et al. (1995) found that men in general achieved higher pay levels than did 
women. Gender stereotyping explanations may shed light why women seldom achieve the same 
level of objective career success as their male counterparts. Kanter (1977) suggests that 
traditional stereotypes impede women from pursuing the same path of career development as 
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men do. In a more recent work, Tharenou (1997) suggests that discrimination against women is 
based on employers‟ expectations that women will underperform men, and therefore may be 
inclined to leave the organization sooner than men do.  
One common explanation for the gap in gender pay has been women‟s temporary 
absence from work during pregnancy while having young children. These derailing instances 
may create fewer incentives for women to invest in their education and training (Becker, 1993). 
Women, with children also are less likely to receive proper training than men are because they 
are expected to remain employed for shorter periods of time (Blundell, Dearden, Meghir, & 
Sianesi, 1999). In the meta-analysis by Ng et al. (2005), gender was found to moderate the 
relationship between education level and career success in terms of pay as well as between 
organizational tenure and pay. This indicates that gender does have a significant impact on 
performance evaluations and career success and therefore, this variable needs to be controlled in 
the proposed model. 
Marital status. A relatively consistent finding in the literature on careers is that married 
individuals achieve higher levels of objective career success than unmarried individuals (Judge 
and Bretz, 1994; Pfeffer & Ross, 1982; Judge, Cable, Boudreau, & Bretz, 1995). According to 
Pfeffer and Ross (1982), spouses can be a valuable support when they can alleviate some of the 
burden of household chores and offer emotional support. For example, Judge and colleagues 
(1995) found that married individuals earned higher income than unmarried individuals did. 
However, if the spouse were also employed outside of the home, then this changed status would 
likely influence a negative relationship between marital status and career success (Judge, Cable, 
Boudreau, & Bretz, 1995). Furthermore, the meta-analysis performed by Ng et al. (2005) found 
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the relationship between married couples and objective career success in terms of pay was 
stronger than that of non-married couples. Based on the effect of marital status on objective 
career success, this variable needs to be controlled in the proposed model. 
Number of dependents. The influence of the number of dependents on objective career 
success has been met with mixed results. On the one hand, the number of dependents has been 
suggested to influence career success positively (Bielby & Bielby, 1989; Judge, Cable, 
Boudreau, & Bretz, 1995), as children foster career stability and job commitment (Stroh, Brett, 
& Reilly, 1996). On the other hand, it is likely that the larger the number of dependents, the more 
time and energy needs to be spent on the family members, and therefore less time can be 
devoted/ dedicated to furthering one‟s career. In any case, this variable needs to be controlled. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DESIGN, METHODOLOGY, AND RESULTS 
This study uses a cross-sectional design and path analysis to test the extended human 
capital theory of career success in the context of a developing country with salient institutional 
and socio-cultural pressures. For this design, secondary data for the years 2009 and 2010 
(performance lagged one year) on 1,042 employees was obtained from a major Ecuadorian 
financial services company. Observations with missing data on any of the substantive variables 
of interest were eliminated from the study using listwise deletion. The number of employees with 
complete secondary information used in this study is 782 (624 non-managers and 158 managers) 
representing 75 percent of the total population of employees. Table 1 provides descriptive 
statistics and intercorrelations for independent, dependent, and control variables.  
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    Table 1         
  Descriptive Statistics, and Intercorrelations      
 Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Gender 0.53 0.50           
2 Marital 
Status 
0.59 0.49 .12**          
3 # Dependents 1.10 1.17 .18** .53**         
4 Age 34.10 7.98 .13** .28** .55**        
5 Tenure 6.72 5.38    .03 .22** .38** .68**       
6 Education 15.53 1.76   -.02  -.08 -.22** -.23** -.17**      
7 Specific 
Training 
1.02 2.65   -.02   .04   .04 .08*  .01  .16     
8 Performance 
Evaluation  
4.28 0.35   -.02   .03  -.04  -.05 -.02  .06  .05    
9 Pay (2010) 818.62 832.53 .03  .10**  .17**  .33** .23** .21** .22** .11**   
10 Rank 1.20 0.40 -.04   .06 .08* .24** .28** .08* .16** .14** .56**  
              
 Note: N= 782; * p<.05 (two-tailed), ** p< .01 (two-tailed); Gender (1=male, 0=female);  
 Rank (1= non-managers, 2= managers).           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3
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Measures of Independent Variables 
Years of Education. The total number of formal years of education for each employee 
was calculated as the sum of the years of high school, undergraduate, diploma‟s, and MBA. The 
number of years of education assumed to be completed for each level of formal education was as 
follows: individuals completing high school were assumed to have completed 12 years of 
education; individuals with an undergraduate degree were assumed to have completed 4 years of 
education; individuals having completed a graduate diploma were assumed to have completed 
one year of education; and those who completed an MBA were assumed to have completed two 
years of education.  
The base number of years of education for individuals who completed high school was 
set at twelve to represent the twelve years of schooling before college. To this base, the number 
years of education beyond secondary schooling was added. For example, individuals who 
completed an undergraduate degree had four years of education added to the twelve years of high 
school for a sum of sixteen years of total education. Also, common in Ecuador are postgraduate 
diplomas/certificates that typically last one year. These certificates are considered an option for 
those individuals who cannot afford or do not have time to pursue an MBA program. Individuals 
completing this postgraduate certificate/ diploma had one year added to the previous sixteen 
years, for a total of seventeen years of education. Individuals who completed a masters‟ degree 
were coded as receiving two years of education (typically MBA programs in Ecuador last two 
years) which was added to the total number of years. In the cases where individuals had more 
than one diploma and/ or MBA degree, the corresponding number of years were also added to 
the total. The sum of the years from undergraduate, postgraduate, and masters‟ degrees yielded 
the total accumulated number of years of education at a given time, which is the measure for the 
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years of education used in this study. While ideally determining whether an individual was 
currently enrolled in or had already completed a specific diploma would have been preferred, the 
available secondary data did not specify these details. Therefore, the assumption was made that 
the degree pursued was eventually completed. 
The total number of years of education ranged from twelve to twenty-one with a mean of 
15.52 (s.d. = 1.76). Approximately 17 percent of the individuals had a high school degree, 74 
percent had a four-year undergraduate degree, and the remaining 9 percent of individuals had 
some form of graduate degree.  
Tenure. Tenure was operationalized as the number of years from the time of employment 
until the time of this study. The tenure ranged from 1 to 36 years with a mean of 6.72 (s.d. = 
5.38) years. 
Training. The firm provides both internal (generic) and external (specific) training for its 
employees. Internal training was considered by the firm to be generic because versions of the 
same type of internal training were offered in most other firms. This type of training was not 
included in this study as human capital theory, as conceptualized by Becker, suggests that 
specific training and not general training influence career success. Specific training was 
operationalized as the total number of independent courses an employee participated in 
externally since the day of initial employment with the firm. The number of courses in which 
individuals participated was used instead of a more accurate measure such as number of hours of 
training because the exact number of hours per course was not available. The assumption was 
that the number of courses in which an employee participates should increase knowledge, skills, 
and abilities, and ultimately influence performance appraisals and career success in terms of pay. 
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The percent of employees who participated in general (internal) training is approximately 
24 percent with a mean of .53 (s.d. = 1.39). The percent of employees who participated in 
specific (external) training is 30 percent with a mean of 1.02 (s.d. = 2.65). 
Performance evaluation. The yearly performance evaluations scores were measured 
using a 5-point likert type scale with 1 (one) indicating poor performance and 5 (five) indicating 
excellent performance. The procedure used for scoring the performance appraisal by the 
supervisors involved the following steps: 1) Each employee established yearly goals and 
provided self-evaluations against these goals; 2) Each employee was evaluated by his or her 
supervisor as to the attainment of the goals established by the employee and by the organization; 
3) The employee and the supervisor were expected to meet and reach a consensus as to the final 
evaluation score; 4) In the case that an agreement was not reached, a representative from the 
human resource department was assigned to act as a mediator between the employee and the 
supervisor; 5) If even after the involvement of the mediator an agreement could not be reached, 
the score proposed by the supervisor took precedence and remained as the final evaluation score.   
The mean performance evaluation score is 4.28 (s.d. = .35).   
Measure of Moderating Variable 
 Rank. The rank of the employees of the financial services firm are divided into six 
categories: presidency, management, assistant management, chief, supervisory, and other levels. 
For the purposes of this study, individuals working in the presidency, managerial, assistant 
managerial, chief or supervisory role were categorized as managers. All individuals labeled by 
the firm to be working in “other levels” were categorized as non-managers. Non-managers 
represent 82 percent of the sample and managers represent 18 percent of the sample. 
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Measure of Dependent Variable 
Objective career success in terms of pay. Pay in Ecuador is typically calculated on a 
monthly basis in terms of the basic fixed monthly salary. In order to normalize the data, a natural 
logarithmic transformation was performed and the resulting outcome was used for the analysis. 
The objective career success variable does not include any variable portions of the salary, 
bonuses or any additional compensation required by Ecuadorian law. Salaries have a broad range 
from $240 per month to almost $9,000 per month with a mean salary of $818.62 per month 
(s.d.= 832.53). 
Measures of Control Variables 
Age. Age was determined by the number of months from birth until the time when this 
study was conducted. Ages ranged from 21 to 64 with a mean age of 34 (s.d.= 7.98). 
Gender. The gender variable will be coded 1 for male and 0 for female. The sample was 
fairly balanced with 46 percent female and 54 percent male. 
Marital status. Marital status was coded 1 for married and 0 for single. The percent of 
employees that were not married in this sample represented 40 percent of all employees while 
the married employees represented 60 percent. 
Number of dependents. The number of dependents was self-reported and 
operationalized as the number of immediate family members who were financially dependent on 
the employee and were under the age of 18. Forty-two percent of the sample does not have 
children, while 58 percent had between one and six children. 
Results of Structural Model 
The data was analyzed using path analysis in Mplus version 6. Path analysis offers the 
 39  
 
benefit of assessing the fit of the overall proposed model, as well as the specific relationships 
among the variables (LeBreton, Wu, & Bing, 2008).  
Three indices were used to determine model fit: chi-square (2), comparative fit index 
(CFI), and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA). The theoretical model resulted in 
a chi-square= 19.48 (d.f.= 5), CFI= .97, and RMSEA= .06. Values of .95 or higher for CFI and 
.06 or lower for RMSEA are considered to result in good fit (Hu and Bentler, 1999). Overall, the 
results suggest good fit of the theoretical model. 
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      TABLE 2     
      
Structural Equation Modeling Results    
      
      
     
Theoretical 
Model    
   Parameter    
Paths Modeled   Coefficient t-Value p-Value 
        
Education Perf. Eval.  0.01 1.34 0.179 
Specific Training Perf. Eval.  0.01 1.27 0.203 
Tenure Perf. Eval.  0.00 -0.29 0.773 
        
Gender Pay  0.02 0.65 0.515 
Age Pay  0.03 8.48 0.000 
Marital Status Pay  0.08 1.89 0.059 
# Dependents Pay  -0.07 -3.43 0.001 
Education Pay  0.09 8.15 0.000 
Specific Training Pay  0.02 2.52 0.012 
Tenure Pay  0.00 -0.76 0.445 
Rank Pay  0.82 17.15 0.000 
        
Perf. Eval. Pay  0.22 4.42 0.000 
Perf. Eval. X Rank Pay  -0.33 -2.49 0.013 
         
            
Note. N= 782. Overall fit: 2= 19.48, d.f.= 5, p<.01, CFI= .97, RMSEA= .06. 
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Hypothesis Testing 
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, of the proposed model, reflecting the economic facet of the 
theory of human capital of career success, predict that performance evaluation scores will have a 
positive mediating relationship between the human capital components and objective career 
success in terms of pay. One of the basic requirements for mediation is that predictor variables 
be significantly related to the mediating variable (LeBreton, Wu, & Bing, 2008). For this model, 
the results of the analysis indicate that none of the human capital components has a relationship 
of statistical significance with performance evaluation scores (years of formal education = .01, 
t= 1.34, p = .18; tenure = .00, t= -.29, p = .77; specific training = .01, t= 1.27, p = .20). 
Therefore the proposed hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 are not supported. 
Hypothesis 4, of the proposed model, reflecting the managerial facet of the human capital 
theory of career success, predicts a significant relationship between performance evaluation 
scores and objective career success in terms of pay. This hypothesis is supported, as performance 
evaluation scores (= .22, t= 4.42, p< .001) did indicate a significant positive relationship with 
objective career success in terms of pay. 
Hypothesis 5, of the proposed model, reflecting the institutional facet of the human 
capital theory of career success, predicts significant relationships between the human capital 
components and objective career success in terms of pay. This hypothesis is supported for the 
components of, years of formal education (= .09, t= 8.15, p< .001) and specific training (= .02, 
t= 2.52, p = .01), which significantly influence career success, but not for the component of 
tenure (= .00, t= -.76, p= .45), which does not have a significant relationship with career 
success in terms of pay. 
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Hypothesis 6, which is related to the boundary condition of the proposed model predicts 
the moderating effect of the rank variable on the relationship between performance evaluation 
scores and objective career success in terms of pay. Specifically, hypothesis 6 predicts that 
performance evaluation scores have a greater influence on career success as pay for non-
managers than for managers. Both performance evaluation scores and rank were mean-centered 
before creating the interaction term. The results indicate that the interaction has a significant 
influence (= -.33, t= -2.49, p = .01) on objective career success in terms of pay (see Figure 3). 
Therefore, hypothesis 6 is supported. This result indicates that as rank increases, the significance 
of the relationship between performance evaluation scores and pay decreases. 
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Post-hoc Analysis 
Given the significant moderating effect of rank on the dependent variable of career 
success in terms of pay, it seems worthwhile to analyze the proposed model separately for each 
group. This post-hoc analysis may identify differences that were not accounted for by the 
original hypotheses, and any interpretation should be limited given the sample-specific nature of 
this investigation. However, any identified differences may prove beneficial for extending this 
work in the future. 
To test the proposed model comparatively for managers and non-managers, subjects were 
grouped by their rank, and the structural model was run for each of the two groups using the 
“grouping” function in Mplus. This procedure allows an opportunity to examine the relationships 
proposed by the model for managers and non-managers independently and then compare the 
results for these two groups. Of the 782 total subjects, 624 are non-managers and 158 are 
managers. The results of the analysis for non-managers are presented in Table 3 in a tabular form 
and in Figure 4 in a graphical form, while the results for managers are presented in Table 4 in a 
tabular form and in Figure 5 in a graphical form. The test of the proposed model upon grouping 
managers and non-managers indicates good fit with a chi-square= 18.46 (d.f.= 8), CFI= .95, and 
RMSEA= .06. 
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    TABLE 3     
     
     
Structural Equation Modeling Results    
     
     
     Theoretical Model (Non-managers) 
  Parameter    
Paths Modeled  Coefficient t-Value p-Value 
       
Education Perf. Eval. 0.01 0.80 0.423 
Specific Training Perf. Eval. 0.01 1.58 0.114 
Tenure Perf. Eval. 0.00 -0.28 0.779 
       
Gender Pay 0.01 0.37 0.714 
Age Pay 0.02 5.80 0.000 
Marital Status Pay 0.08 1.93 0.054 
# Dependents Pay -0.08 -3.68 0.000 
Education Pay 0.08 6.77 0.000 
Specific Training Pay 0.03 3.79 0.000 
Tenure Pay 0.00 -0.01 0.990 
       
Perf. Eval. Pay 0.28 5.59 0.000 
        
     
          
Note. N= 624. Overall fit: 2= 18.46, d.f.= 8, p=.02, CFI= .95, RMSEA= .06. 
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    TABLE 4     
     
     
Structural Equation Modeling Results    
     
     
           Theoretical Model (Managers) 
  Parameter    
Paths Modeled  Coefficient t-Value p-Value 
       
Education Perf. Eval. 0.01 0.64 0.526 
Specific Training Perf. Eval. 0.00 -0.61 0.543 
Tenure Perf. Eval. -0.01 -2.40 0.017 
       
Gender Pay 0.04 0.46 0.643 
Age Pay 0.06 7.17 0.000 
Marital Status Pay 0.09 0.81 0.421 
# Dependents Pay 0.01 0.11 0.916 
Education Pay 0.09 3.99 0.000 
Specific Training Pay 0.00 -0.16 0.876 
Tenure Pay -0.02 -1.68 0.093 
       
Perf. Eval. Pay 0.19 1.26 0.209 
        
     
          
Note. N= 158. Overall fit: 2= 18.46, d.f.= 8, p=.02, CFI= .95, RMSEA= .06.  
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The results of testing the economic facet of the theory of human capital of career success 
in terms of pay indicate that the relationship between the human capital components and 
performance evaluations for the non-manager group, is not statistically significant (years of 
formal education = .01, t= .80, p = .42; tenure = .00, t= -.28, p = .78; specific training = .01, 
t= 1.58, p = .11).  The results for the managerial group, indicate that two human capital 
components have statistically non-significant relationships with performance evaluation scores 
(years of formal education = .01, t= .64, p = .53; specific training = .00, t= -.61, p = .54), 
while the tenure component of human capital has a significant relationship (tenure = -.01, t=     
-2.40, p = .02) with performance evaluation scores. Interestingly, the significance of this 
relationship is in the opposite direction from the predicted direction indicating potential leniency 
toward externally-recruited managers, which should be further researched. 
The results of testing the managerial facet of the human capital theory of career success, 
for non-managers, indicate that performance evaluation scores (= .28, t= 5.59, p< .001) have a 
significant positive relationship with objective career success in terms of pay. In contrast, the 
performance evaluation scores of managers (= .19, t= 1.26, p = .21) do not have a significant 
relationship with pay. These results support the interaction effect found in the original analysis, 
indicated that, as hypothesized, a boundary condition of the theoretical model is set by rank. 
The results of testing the institutional facet of the human capital theory of career success, 
for non-managers, indicate that years of formal education (= .08, t= 6.77, p< .001) and the level 
of specific training (= .03, t= 3.79, p< .001) have a significant influence on career success in 
terms of pay. This support for the theoretical predictions based on the institutional facet was not 
found for length of tenure (= .00, t= -.01, p = .99) that did not significantly influence career 
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success in terms of pay of non-managers. The results of testing these relationships for managers 
indicate that years of formal education (= .09, t= 3.99, p< .001) significantly influence career 
success in terms of pay. Therefore, years of formal education significantly influence career 
success in terms of pay for both the non-managerial and managerial samples. However, in the 
case of managers, specific training (= .00, t= -.16, p = .88) and the length of tenure (= -.02, t= 
-1.68, p= .09) do not show a significant influence on career success in terms of pay. Therefore, 
the predictions based on the institutional facet of human capital of career success are supported 
for the human capital component of education for both the managerial and non-managerial 
groups. While the prediction for specific training is supported only for the non-managerial group, 
the prediction of significant influence of tenure on career success in terms of pay was not found 
either for non-managers or managers. 
 48  
 
 
 49  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 50  
 
CHAPTER 4 
INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
 The main purpose of this dissertation is to extend the theory of human capital of career 
success by complementing the traditional economic human capital facet with the social 
institutional facet that takes into account managerial responses to socio-cultural and other 
environmental pressures, and the behavioral managerial facet that takes into account the 
influence of HR policies and practices on objective career success. The integration of these 
facets allows researchers to examine multiple theoretical pathways of human capital impact on 
objective career success in terms of pay. An additional purpose of the dissertation was to identify 
a possible boundary condition of the extended theory.  
 The results of the analysis of the proposed extension of human capital theory of career 
success indicate that in socially thick environments, such as those found in Latin American 
countries, institutional and managerial facets of human capital theory provide a better 
explanation as to how human capital translates into objective career success than does the 
economic facet. In other words, the main prediction of the economic facet of the theory that the 
greater accumulation of human capital results in higher performance evaluations and 
consequently to higher pay was generally not supported by this study conducted in the 
Ecuadorian context where only managerial and institutional facets proved to be generally 
significant.    
 The institutional facet of the theory of human capital of career success posits that 
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individuals will achieve greater career success based on the symbolic rather than economic value 
of their formal education and training. The results from the analyses indicate that education 
influences objective career success directly, while having no significant influence in a mediated 
way through performance evaluation scores. In allocating pay, managers appear to be influenced 
primarily by institutional pressures such as those coming from benchmarking based on the use of 
salary surveys. The manager may also be influenced by the symbolic value of the employees‟ 
degrees obtained through formal education when they allocate pay to both non-managers and 
managers. This finding of significant symbolic rather than economic value of education for 
objective career success is important because there is a paucity of research addressing 
institutional pressures coming from external labor markets or socio-cultural environment and 
influence objective career success (Dulebohn & Werling, 2007). This is particularly relevant 
because numerous authors (i.e., Fernandez-Alees, Cuevas-Rodriguez, & Valle-Cabrera, 2006) 
have suggested that certain human capital components (i.e., years of formal education) may 
provide a signal as to an individuals knowledge, skills, and abilities and thus influence objective 
career success in terms of pay beyond the influence of performance evaluations. Therefore, the 
lack of support for performance evaluations as the explanatory mechanism between education 
and pay in the institutional context of a developing country (Ecuador) may suggest non-
economic factors may be influencing managerial decisions regarding employee pay.  
The institutional explanation of objective career success also suggests that the symbolic 
value of specific training may significantly influence objective career success in terms of pay. 
The results from this study indicate support for this hypothesis based on the institutional facet of 
the human capital theory of career success. However, once managers and non-managers are 
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compared in the post-hoc analysis, the obtained results suggest that only non-managers are 
rewarded through higher pay (i.e., objective career success) for participating in specialized 
training. This means that only the results for non-managers support the institutional facet of 
human capital theory that predicts that individuals will receive a higher pay based on the 
symbolic value of their training and/ or based on the assessed demand for such training in the 
external labor market (i.e., which is benchmarked based on salary surveys). In contrast to non-
managers, managers are not rewarded for attending specialized training seminars, most likely 
because the marginal benefit of training for non-managers is perceived to be greater than that for 
managers thus resulting in its greater impact on non-managerial than managerial compensation.  
 Although hypothesized as significant, based on the institutional facet, tenure does not 
have a significant influence on objective career success in terms of pay for either non-managers 
or managers. This means that specific tacit knowledge acquired over years of working at a 
particular firm is not rewarded as pay (Altonji & Williams, 2005). This finding is consistent, in 
part, with previous research that suggests that unskilled workers benefit more from staying at a 
particular job while skilled workers benefit much less. In other words, “for skilled workers 
human capital is transferable and tenure is not as important” (Dustmann & Meghir, 2005, p. 79). 
As the sample for this dissertation was obtained from a firm in the financial services industry, 
where the majority of employees are skilled workers, the non-significant results for the tenure-
pay relationship from this dissertation mirrors the results from other studies from the career 
success literature. Also, research from the United Kingdom and the United States suggests that, 
while the impact of seniority on wages is modest for union workers, it becomes negligible for 
nonunion workers (Williams, 2009). As the sample of this particular study was obtained from a 
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non-unionized firm, the results are consistent with the results from other studies with non-
unionized labor.  
The non-significant relationship between tenure and career success in terms of pay for 
non-managers and managers also suggests that, regardless of the knowledge individuals 
accumulate over time, they may not meet the formal educational requirements in order to obtain 
promotions into positions with higher educational requirements (Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, & 
Franco-Santos, 2010). This inference is consistent with the institutional facet of human capital 
theory in that different forms of human capital may be granted different levels of legitimacy 
across organizations. In other words, degrees obtained through formal education may have more 
symbolic value, and therefore greater legitimacy, than tenure may have. Therefore, in a 
competitive environment, organizations may be more willing to pay for the explicit symbolic 
value of degrees, than for implicit value implied to have been accrued through years of 
experience.  
 The managerial facet of the theory of human capital of career success suggests that 
performance evaluations and pay will be related only to the extent to which appropriate policies 
are implemented as practices to motivate individuals to use their knowledge, skills, and abilities 
to their fullest extent. The results obtained in this study support this hypothesis indicating that 
personnel with higher performance evaluations also have greater objective career success. More 
specifically, performance evaluation scores influence career success in terms of pay to a greater 
extent for non-managers than for managers. This finding supports the notion that at managerial 
levels, performance evaluations become more ambiguous and more difficult to measure and that 
at those levels, career success may be more the result of managerial responses to institutional 
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pressures and not to performance evaluations. Also, given the collectivistic culture and power 
distance that exists between non-managers and managers in Latin America, the finding supports 
the hypothesized inference that managers are not held to the same standards as non-managers. In 
particular, the results from the study show that performance evaluation scores are an important 
consideration for the objective career success of non-managers while not important for 
managers.   
 The economic facet of the theory of human capital of career success points to 
performance evaluations as the explanatory mechanism for the relationships between the human 
capital components and objective career success in terms of pay. However, in this study none of 
the human capital components (i.e., formal education, specific training, and tenure) influence 
performance evaluations. The finding that the economic facet does not explain objective career 
success, while the institutional and managerial facets do, is intriguing. This finding is interesting 
because it suggests that the claim of human capital theory that greater human capital results in 
greater performance does not seem to apply in a highly socialized context with strong 
institutional forces that may influence managerial decision-making such as that found in 
Ecuador. In other words, in highly socialized environments such as Latin America, greater 
importance appears to be placed on the symbolic value of education in applying pay for 
performance compensation HR practices while ignoring the link between human capital 
development and performance. This perspective is consistent with the findings of Medoff and 
Abraham (1980, 1981) as well as the replication of the same study by Flabbi and Ichino (2001), 
suggesting that performance evaluations do not explain the relationship of seniority and wages as 
suggested by human capital theory. Therefore, this theme requires further in-depth research. 
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CHAPTER 5 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The drivers of environmental changes such as globalization, hypercompetition, trade 
liberalization, deindustrialization, decrease in unionization, outsourcing, downsizing have 
influenced a shift away from manufacturing industries to more knowledge and service dominant 
industries thus altering the organization-employee relationship. As a result, human resource 
policies and practices have moved away from offering employees stable life-long employment 
with progressive promotion opportunities to requiring their responsiveness to market factors (i.e., 
with the rewards based on benchmarking of salaries) and performance (i.e., with competency-
based pay) (Dulebohn & Werling, 2007). These changes require researchers to develop a better 
understanding of the factors influencing objective career success. Also, as the focus of past 
research on career success has taken place in developed countries, there is a need to understand 
how objective career success is achieved in developing countries. This dissertation addresses this 
need by integrating three complementary facets (i.e., economic, managerial, and institutional) of 
the human capital theory of career success to identify influences on career success in a context of 
socio-cultural and institutional pressures of a developing country (i.e., Ecuador). The results 
from this dissertation offer both theoretical as well as practical implications. 
Research Implications 
This dissertation extends existing career success research by integrating three 
complementary facets of human capital theory to explain objective career success. The model 
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developed based on these facets is tested for an explanation of how objective career success is 
achieved in a developing country environment with strong socio-cultural and institutional 
pressures. This testing of multiple theoretical facets implies theory pruning (Gray & Cooper, 
2010). Theory pruning techniques allows for “limiting, bounding, and perhaps reducing theory, 
outside a large, multistudy framework” (Leavitt, Mitchell, and Peterson, 2010). Van de Ven and 
Johnson (2006, p. 814) suggest that “one has a much greater likelihood of making important 
knowledge advances to theory and practice if the study is designed so that it juxtaposes and 
compares competing plausible explanations of the phenomena being investigated.”  
Owing to the employment of the theory pruning approach, the results of this study 
challenge the primary assumption of the economic facet of human capital theory, which suggests 
performance evaluations as the explanatory link between human capital development and 
objective career success, for alternative theoretical explanations for the relationships between 
human capital and objective career success. More specifically, the institutional and managerial 
facets appear to be driving objective career success in terms of pay in the Latin American 
context. In this way, human capital theory of career success was theoretically and empirically 
pruned. 
 The approach used in this dissertation responds to a call for careers researchers to 
consider how environmental factors influence career success (Dulebohn & Werling, 2007) 
beyond traditional internal labor market factors. They suggest that given the shift to a 
knowledge- based economy has diminished the importance of firm-specific knowledge and has 
placed more emphasis on industry-specific knowledge. The findings from this dissertation appear 
to support the claim that institutional forces influence managerial decisions regarding pay. In 
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other words, as suggested by the institutional facet proposed in this dissertation, objective career 
success is strongly influenced by factors external to a specific job performance metric. 
Practical Implications 
 Dulebohn and Werling (2007) suggest that there still remains a disconnect between 
academic research and actual human resource practices regarding pay. This study tries to breach 
the academic practitioner gap by considering alternative complementary explanations (i.e., 
economic, managerial, and institutional) for objective career success and testing these 
explanations using one firm with rich secondary data. The results from this study offer several 
practical implications for both individuals and organizations. From an individual perspective, the 
findings suggest that non-managers, in a Latin American context, have three ways to further their 
objective career success in terms of pay: 1) by pursuing more years of formal education, 2) by 
participating in specific on the job training, and 3) by elevating their performance evaluations. 
Managers, on the other hand, can achieve greater objective career success solely through more 
years of formal education. This last finding is especially interesting given the significant negative 
relationship between years of tenure and performance evaluations. It appears, therefore, that 
managers are able to attain greater objective career success in terms of pay despite the scores on 
their performance evaluations. These findings support the institutional facet that suggests that 
managers, especially in societies with strong in-group collectivism and high power distance, are 
rewarded on the symbolic basis of their years of education. Also, these findings lend support to 
suggestions that money has greater instrumental value at lower organizational levels and 
therefore may not offer the primary motivation for managers to perform. Stajkovic and Luthans 
(2001) suggest that feedback and social recognition may prove to be stronger motivators than 
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money for managerial positions. 
 From an organizational perspective, the results offer insights as to the human resource 
policies and practices that drive objective career success. Specifically, the findings of this study 
present the human resource department with three questions: 1) Why are employees being 
rewarded for the development of their human capital while their human capital is not reflected on 
their performance evaluations? 2) Why are managers not being paid, in part, based on their 
performance evaluations?  
Research primarily in Western societies support the notion that hiring individuals with 
greater levels of human capital results in greater on the job performance (Ng & Feldman, 2010). 
Contrary to these findings, the results from the current study do not support this position. Based 
on the results of the current study, it may be inferred that firms in Ecuador are hiring employees 
based on their credentials and compensating them according to the symbolic value of those 
credentials. In other words, while rewarding non-managerial employees based on their 
performance evaluations is consistent with pay for performance practices, the non-significant 
relationship between performance evaluations and pay for managers indicate that managers are 
being rewarded solely based on their credentials and not for their performance. Rewarding 
managers based on their formal education and not for their performance should draw attention 
from human resource departments to find ways to link performance and pay at higher 
organizational levels. From an economic perspective, the firm is paying for individuals with 
higher degrees as well as for their specific training while not benefiting from enhanced 
performance. This finding should encourage human resource departments to measure the specific 
competencies their employees are acquiring from training, and how these competencies are being 
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applied on the job. 
The finding of a significant negative relationship between tenure and performance 
evaluations should also be of concern to human resource directors. It would appear that once an 
individual reaches a managerial position, based primarily on their formal education, they may 
over time develop a sense of entitlement. This sense of entitlement, which is typical in high 
power distance cultures may be influencing managers to lower their performance as the more 
seniority they achieve. 
Limitations 
Research studies conducted based on data sources from a developing country often 
encounter limitations of generalizability. This problem was encountered in this study because 
only one pioneering Ecuadorian firm was using pay for performance across all of its employees 
as a part of its HR pay policy. However, this limitation can be somewhat overcome because 
Brutus, Gill and Duniewicz (2010) suggest that gaining a clear understanding of the context in 
which a study takes place helps to generalize to other similar contexts. Specifically, the authors 
stress the primacy of the generalizability of the independent variables over the generalizability of 
the sample. This suggestion is applicable to this dissertation because a detailed understanding of 
the different types of variables used offers the possibility of generalizing the results of the study 
to other similar contexts.   
In this study, some internal validity concerns may arise due to the operationalization of 
the performance evaluation score. Two specific concerns are: 1) the assumption that supervisor 
evaluation scores reflect actual productivity, and 2) by using secondary data provided by the 
firm, the reliability of the performance evaluation score has not been tested. However, the use of 
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supervisor evaluations as a proxy for performance, while controversial, has been widely used in 
research and furthermore is necessary for research in industries where productivity is not readily 
measurable due to its intangible nature of performance in service industries. While obtaining an 
objective measure of productivity in a service industry may be elusive, the performance 
evaluation score in the specific case of the firm used in this dissertation is the result of an 
assessment by both supervisor and subordinate as to whether jointly established goals were 
actually met. Therefore, the achievement of established goals should be mapped onto 
performance evaluation scores and may be considered a measure of productivity. 
While firm generated performance evaluation scores have not been tested for reliability, 
these performance evaluation scores, and not performance evaluations with established 
reliabilities, are the ones considered in the pay-for-performance HR policies established by the 
organization. In other words, while from a research perspective measurement instruments are 
expected to be validated, objective career success is based in part on non-validated performance 
evaluation measures as the ones to be used in this dissertation. Therefore, testing the extension 
on the human capital theory of career success with the performance evaluation scores as actually 
used by the firm offers a more natural test of the proposed model.  
An inherent limitation to this study is its cross-sectional design. Cross-sectional designs 
do not allow for causal inferences therefore limiting the inferences from the study to conclusions 
regarding the proposed relationships. While stronger causal inferences could be made using a 
longitudinal design, the cross-sectional design used in this study offers a first step in testing the 
proposed model. Furthermore, the results from this research may serve to better inform how 
relationships interact as well as their boundary conditions before developing a more dynamic 
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model and hypothesizing how changes in human capital may influence changes in performance 
evaluations and consequently changes in career success. 
Future Research Directions 
The extension of the human capital theory of career success, as proposed in this 
dissertation, lends itself for future testing using a longitudinal design in order to dynamically test 
the relationships proposed in this dissertation. Specifically, researchers may investigate how 
changes in human capital influence changes in performance evaluation scores and consequently 
changes in objective career success. A longitudinal design can overcome some of the imitations 
of cross-sectional designs by dynamically testing theory (Pitariu & Ployhart, 2010; Ployhart & 
Vandenberg, 2010).  
Another avenue for future research is to gain a better understanding of how different 
competencies are developed by the alternative forms of human capital and how those 
competencies become mapped on performance evaluation scores and consequently objective 
career success. For example, political skill may be developed through formal education, training, 
and/or tenure and consequently influence performance evaluations as well as compensation. 
Finally, prior research indicated that the antecedents for objective career success are 
different than those for subjective career success (Ng, Eby, Sorensen, & Feldman, 2005). Future 
career research can focus on explaining how human capital development and performance 
valuations influence not only objective career success, but also subjective career success. 
Conclusion 
This dissertation extends human capital theory beyond the traditional economic rational 
perspective to include the influence of managerial policies and practices as well as the influence 
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of socio-cultural and institutional pressures. Specifically, this dissertation explains how  
human capital influences objective career success of managers and non-managers in a socially-
rich environment such as Ecuador, a Latin American region relatively neglected in the current 
literature. This contribution resonates well with the argument of Thomas and Inkson, and Ituma 
and Simpson that “in order to better understand individual‟s career needs, we must progress 
beyond the individualistic and de-contextualized models offered by the majority of studies and 
develop a more complex interpretation, which acknowledges the interplay between individual 
careers and the wider institutional and national cultures” (Ituma & Simpson, 2006, p. 992). 
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Hypothesis. Journal of Applied Management and Entrepreneurship, Vol. 15, No. 1, 84-
95. 
 
Bynum, L. A., Clayton, R., Hayek, M., Moeller, M. & Williams, W. (2009). Chandler as a 
Biographer: Content Thematic Analysis of Chandler‟s Biography of Henry Varnum 
Poor, Journal of Management History, Vol. 15, No. 3, 272-283. 
 
CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS 
 
Hayek, M. (2010). Control Beliefs and Positive Psychological Capital: Can Entrepreneurs  
Discriminate Between What Can and Cannot be Controlled? Competitive paper 
presentation at the Southern Management Association, Annual Meeting, St. Petersberg, 
Fl. 
 
Ammeter, A., Thomas, C.H., Novicevic, M., Garner, B., Hayek, M., Bogicevic, B.M. (2010).     
Theory of Moral Accountability: An Empirical Test in the Context of  Academic 
Cheating. Competitive paper presentation at the Southern Management     Association, 
Annual Meeting, St. Petersberg, FL. 
 
Hayek, M. (2009). Bounded Rationality: An Argument for ADHD and Entrepreneurship.   
Competitive paper presentation at the Southern Management Association, Annual 
Meeting, Ashville, NC. 
 
Hayek, M. (2009). The Influence of Status Inconsistency on Intergenerational Family   Business 
Success. Competitive paper presentation at the International Academy of  Business and 
Public Administration, Memphis, TN. 
 
Novicevic, M., Bynum, L.A., Hayek, M. & Fang, T. (2009). Integrating Barnard‟s and  
Contemporary Views of Industrial Relations and HRM. Poster presentation at the  
Academy of Management, Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL.  
 
RESEARCH IN PROGRESS 
 
Hayek, M. & Salem, R. A Conversation with the Pizza Princess: Diane Barrentine on   
Entrepreneurial Leadership, revise and resubmit.  
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Ammeter, A., Thomas, C.H., Novicevic, M., Garner, B., Hayek, M. & Bobicevic, B.M. Theory  
of Moral Accountability: An Empirical Test in the Context of Academic Cheating, under 
development. 
 
TEACHING EXPERIENCE 
 
University of Mississippi, Oxford, MS – spring 2010 to present. 
 
Spring 2011, Strategic Management (undergraduate capstone course) 
Spring 2011, Principles of Management 
 Teaching evaluation: available in May 2011 
Fall 2010, Strategic Management (undergraduate capstone course) 
 Teaching evaluation: 4.23 on a 5-point scale (Comparative reference group: 3.75) 
Spring 2010, Strategic Management (undergraduate capstone course) 
 Teaching evaluation: 4.33 on a 5-point scale (Comparative reference group: 3.88) 
 
Universidad San Francisco de Quito, Quito, Ecuador -- 1999 to 2008.   
 
Courses Taught in English and Spanish:  
 
International Business, Business Policy, Entrepreneurship/New Venture Creation, Project 
Management, Introduction to Corporate Finance, Managerial Finance, Advanced Finance, 
Financial Markets and Institutions, and Investments and Risk Management, Introduction to 
Marketing and Marketing for Services.  
 
Courses Taught On-Line 
 
Financial Markets and Institutions, Investments and Risk Management and Project Management 
(for over six years). 
 
Seminars Delivered 
Taught seminars on entrepreneurship, motivation, business plan writing and project management 
at the graduate and undergraduate level in various provinces of Ecuador as well as via 
teleconferencing for the USFQ Graduate School.   
 
Program Development: New Venture Creation and Entrepreneurship Center 
Developed an experiential learning exercise where students write business plans and then 
establish their new ventures on campus for a period of seven days. This project began with one 
class in the business school approximately five years ago resulting in sales of $2,000. Currently 
this project integrates students from across disciplines and in 2009 produced over $130,000 
during a seven-day period. A portion of the profits is used to sustain the entrepreneurship center. 
 
Entrepreneurship Center Development 
Created an entrepreneurship center to serve both students and the local community. The purpose 
of the entrepreneurship center is to offer advice and support to nascent entrepreneurs as well as 
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small and medium size enterprises in the local community. A unique feature of the 
entrepreneurship center is that it is financially self-sustaining by obtaining funds from a portion 
of the profits produced by the new ventures created by the students each semester. 
 
Guest Lecturing 
Invited by Babson College to co-teach a train-the-trainers course in entrepreneurship in April 
2008 in Guayaquil, Ecuador. 
 
PROFESSIONAL SERVICE 
 
Professional Affiliations 
 Academy of Management 
 Southern Management Association 
 Project Management Institute (Project Management Professional certified by the Project 
Management Institute) 
 
Professional Activities 
 Session Chair, Entrepreneurship/ Information Technology/ Innovation Track of the 
Southern Management Association Conference, 2009 
 Discussant, Organizational Behavior Track of the 2009 Southern Management 
Association Conference, 2009 
 Reviewer, Southern Management Association Entrepreneurship/Information Technology/ 
Innovation, 2009 
 Reviewer, Southern Management Association Management History/Management 
Education, 2009 
 Ad Hoc Reviewer, Journal of Management History 
 Ad Hoc Reviewer, Journal of Business Ethics  
WORK EXPERIENCE 
VENTURE CAPITALIST (Co-owner of 75%) 
Ecuador In Situ, Quito, Ecuador – 2006 to present 
Online tour operator business. 
 
VENTURE CAPITALIST (Co-owner of 50%) 
Termino 1/2, Quito, Ecuador – 2006 to 2009 
Hospitality business. 
 
OWNER/GENERAL MANAGER 
Sociedad Haymiq Compania Limitada, Quito, Ecuador -- 1998 to present  
Developed Sociedad Haymiq from one restaurant in 1998 and diversified it to include a motel, a 
tour operator (affiliated to IATA), a bar, and a commercial real estate developer and operator.  
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CONSULTANT 
Big Branch, Quito, Ecuador, June 2007 
Business valuation. 
 
New Access, Quito, Ecuador, May 2007 
Financial analysis for US investors. 
 
SATEMO, Quito, Ecuador, October to December 2002 
Financial valuation for two merging chemical companies.       
 
PARTNER (50%)/ FACTORY MANAGER 
Fabriplast, Quito, Ecuador -- October 1997 to May 1998  
General manager responsible for overseeing production, quality control, human resources, 
purchases, and inventory control in this recycled low density polyethylene plastic factory.   
 
PARTNER/ GENERAL MANAGER 
La Cocina De Kristy and Café K, Quito, Ecuador -- February 1997 to September 1997 
Business development of this new venture. 
 
CONSULTANT 
Cosideco, Quito, Ecuador -- December 1996 to February 1997 
Business plan development. 
 
STOCK BROKER 
Americorp Securities, New York USA -- November 1995 to December 1996   
Obtained Series 7 and 63 licenses. Portfolio management.  
 
CERTIFICATES 
 
 Babson Symposium for Entrepreneurship Educators Argentina, 2007 
 Entrepreneurial Leadership Training-of-Trainers Certificate, Babson College October, 
2006  
 Project Management Professional (PMP), October 2005 
PROFESSIONAL SEMINARS ATTENDED 
 
 Testing Interactions with Linear Regression, Center for Advancement of Research 
Methods and Analysis (CARMA), Virginia Commonwealth University, 2009 
 Meta Analysis: Models and Processes, Center for Advancement of Research Methods and 
Analysis (CARMA), Virginia Commonwealth University, 2009 
 Project Management, CFC, Quito, Ecuador 2005 
 Project Management, CFC, Quito, Ecuador 2004 
 Financial Statement Analysis, CEFE, Quito, Ecuador 1994 
 Budgeting, CEFE, Quito, Ecuador 1994 
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 Marketing, CEFE, Quito, Ecuador 1994 
